We provide arguments and present evidence that corporate governance structures are composed of interrelated mechanisms, which are in turn endogenous responses to the costs and benefits firms face when they choose those mechanisms. Examining board structures and the use of corporate charter provisions in a sample of more than 2,300 firms over a four-year period we find that firms cluster in their use of governance mechanisms. In particular, the set of charter provisions that firms use, as measured by the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) G Index, is associated with board structure, with the laws of the state in which the firm is incorporated, and with firm and industry characteristics. We also find that some governance structures appear to serve as substitutes. Specifically, firms that have powerful boards (as measured by board independence) also have the greatest number of charter provisions, suggesting that the market for corporate control is less effective as a monitoring mechanism for these firms. In contrast, firms that have less powerful boards tend to have few charter provisions, suggesting that the market for corporate control plays a greater monitoring role at such firms. To address potential endogeneity issues, we employ three-stage least squares analysis to estimate these relationships within a system of equations. Our results from this analysis are consistent with the hypothesis that powerful boards serve as a substitute for the market for corporate control. Finally, our findings suggest that causality runs from the board to the choice of charter provisions, but not vice versa.
Corporate governance mechanisms in publicly traded corporations arise as a response to agency conflicts between owners and managers, conflicts that result from the separation of ownership and control. These mechanisms can be either internal (e.g., the boards of directors, charter provisions, inside ownership, blockholders) or external (e.g., the market for corporate control, legal and regulatory rules, investor monitoring, labor and product markets). The interaction of these mechanisms determines the effectiveness of a firm's total governance structure (Jensen, 1993; John and Senbet, 1998; and Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) . However, individual governance mechanisms entail both costs and benefits, and these costs and benefits likely vary across firms, resulting in governance structures with different compositions and effects.
A large literature examines firms' corporate governance structures, with (for example) an important subset of work devoted to the relation between measures of a firm's corporate governance and its value or performance, the results of which suggest that corporate governance affects managerial conduct.
1 Yet, researchers have not fully considered the manner in which different governance mechanisms interact, and the extent to which these mechanisms of governance may be substitutes or complements. An understanding of how the different mechanisms interact, in turn, is important in interpreting their effects. For example, one might expect that structures providing more power to the board in its relationship with management are associated with fewer charter provisions (e.g., staggered boards or poison pills). This could result in a stronger governance role for the market for corporate control, suggesting that powerful boards and the takeover market would be complements in the firms' governance structures. Such a complementary relation could result if the costs and benefits of these governance structures are fairly homogeneous, leading firms to adopt mechanisms to similar degrees of strength. On the other hand, the costs and benefits of the different governance mechanisms might be such that board structures and the openness of a firm to the market for corporate control act as substitutes. That is, firms with many antitakeover provisions in place (and thus barriers to the market for corporate control) might rely on monitoring by powerful boards, which would be consistent with heterogeneity in the costs and benefits of these mechanisms across firms (or within firms over time).
In order to understand the effects of the benefits and costs of governance mechanisms and the degree to which they affect the interactions among these mechanisms, the first question we address in this paper is whether the board of directors and a firm's choice of charter provisions act as substitutes or complements to each other. A related question is whether these interactions are associated with aspects of the firm's environment, including firm characteristics and other firm-specific governance structures, such as the legal environment in the firm's state of incorporation, institutional investor monitoring, and inside ownership. To answer these questions we employ a panel data set of corporate governance mechanisms for more than 2,300 firms for each of four years, 1997, 1998, 1999 and 2000 . We investigate these firms' portfolios of governance mechanisms by focusing on the interactions among board characteristics, corporate charter provisions (e.g., antitakeover measures), and elements of law based on firms' states of incorporation and the relation of these mechanisms to industry and firm characteristics.
2
For corporate charter provisions, an important step in our understanding of the effects of corporate governance is the work of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2002) and their "G" index of governance based on firms' use of charter provisions. We build on this analysis by examining the relation between the charter provisions (as represented by the G index) and other governance mechanisms, in particular, the structure of the board. 3 We begin by testing two mutually exclusive hypotheses: the first is that the strength of the market for corporate control 2 Previous research has found a relation between corporate governance structures and industry characteristics (e.g., Gillan, Hartzell, and Starks, 2003; Keischnik, et al, 2005) . 3 While we have a broad set of governance data, it is by no means complete. For example, we abstract from aspects of governance such as the role of outside block ownership by non-institutional investors. We think of our data as capturing the features of governance most directly controllable by the firm: its board of directors, charter provisions, and state of incorporation.
(as indicated by the presence of few charter provisions, i.e., firms that have a low G index) acts as a complement for a powerful board. That is, does strong monitoring by the market for corporate control arise in the same firms as powerful boards? The second hypothesis is whether these two mechanisms appear as substitutes. Using cluster analysis we find support for the second hypothesis in that we find evidence of distinctly different approaches to governance choices across firms, and that powerful boards appear to be a substitute for a fully functioning takeover market. Firms with many charter provisions tend to have shareholderoriented boards.
Given this result, we turn to the hypothesis that firms' costs and benefits of different governance mechanisms provide a rationale for governance choices, implying that firm characteristics drive the cross-sectional variation in governance structures. 4 Consequently, we test for systematic variation in firm characteristics across clusters that are formed on governance choices, and find striking differences, consistent with heterogeneous costs and benefits of these mechanisms across firms. As a further and more complete test, we employ multivariate regression analysis in order to consider the effects of firm characteristics and other governance mechanisms in place at the firm. To facilitate this analysis, we employ principal components methods to provide insights into the commonalities of board design across firms and to construct a summary board structure measure for subsequent analyses. Using our summary measure of board structure along with the G index, we find these governance structures are a function of firm characteristics and appear to arise as substitutes.
To address potential endogeneity issues, we employ three-stage least squares techniques to estimate a system of two equations, where we believe we can exclude some exogenous variables from each equation (i.e., they serve as instruments). Again we find 4 We interpret evidence of significant relations between firm characteristics and the power of governance structures as consistent with firms considering the relative costs and benefits of governance choices when they optimize their portfolio of governance mechanisms. Thus, we have in mind that firms are at or near their optimal governance structure during our sample. Alternatively, if firms are not optimizing their governance choices (in our context, board design and choice of charter amendments), then significant relations between firm characteristics and the power of governance mechanisms may not be driven by relative costs and benefits of governance as functions of those characteristics.
evidence that is consistent with the hypothesis that powerful boards serve as a substitute for the market for corporate control and that the causality runs from the board to the choice of charter provisions, but not vice versa.
Although our three broad sets of governance choices -board structure, corporate charter provisions, and state of incorporation -have been studied extensively, previous empirical work has generally differed from our approach in two primary ways. First, many prior studies have focused on the effects of one of these mechanisms in isolation on firm value, performance, or specific corporate decisions (e.g., see Yermack, 1996 , on board size, Weisbach, 1988 , on board independence, or reviews by Hermalin and Weisbach, 2002, for boards of directors and Bittlingmayer, 1999, for the market for corporate control). In contrast,
we consider a broader set of governance choices, similar to the approaches of Danielson and Karpoff (1998) and Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) .
Second, we examine several corporate governance structures and the relation between these structures, rather than focusing on one particular aspect of corporate governance.
Cremers and Nair (2005) have a similar focus to ours in that they examine a combination of mechanisms. They also employ the G Index as a proxy for the market for corporate control but for their second mechanism they employ the monitoring by certain institutional investors, i.e., the percentage share control of institutional blockholders and the percentage share ownership of public pension funds. Our study differs in that we examine the mechanisms over which the firm has some control, the governance provisions and board structure, while controlling for other aspects of governance such as the firm's legal and regulatory environment, institutional monitoring and inside ownership. An important consideration when interpreting the interactions among measures of corporate governance is that the measures are assumed to capture the power (or weakness) of the different parties, management, or boards of directors (representing shareholders) and a difference exists between having more power and having optimal corporate governance.
Board characteristics, charter provisions and state laws
Rather than trying to examine whether governance mechanisms provide optimal monitoring, we simply try to measure the power provided by the mechanisms. For example, a more powerful board does not necessarily imply optimal monitoring, as the costs of giving that board more power may outweigh the benefits. Consider the role of independent directors on boards:
According to many institutional investors and corporate oversight bodies, independent directors provide superior oversight as compared to directors with links to corporate management. 5 The implication is that boards should consist of a majority of independent directors. There are, however, costs of having too high a proportion of outsiders on the board. Outside directors do not have the detailed information that inside directors possess from their involvement in firms'
activities. In addition, outside directors may not have the same time and commitment as insiders because of their other responsibilities. In the extreme, a board consisting of exclusively outsiders could make poorer decisions than a board with some insiders. 6
Board structure
The most prominent governance mechanism that managers can affect is the board of directors, whose duty is to represent the shareholders. In order to construct a measure of board structure, we need guidance as to what enhances a board's monitoring capabilities, i.e., which board characteristics affect firm governance. Previous research suggests that the board characteristics which affect the board's effectiveness include board size, independence, and composition (John and Senbet, 1998) . 7 For example, theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that communication and coordination problems with larger boards imply that smaller boards are more efficient (Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996) . In addition, several studies have found links between the independence of the board and its monitoring capabilities (e.g., Fama and Jensen, 1983; Weisbach, 1988; Brickley, Coles, and Terry, 1994; Borokhovich, Parrino, and Trapani, 1996) , and the independence of board monitoring committees, i.e., the audit, compensation, and nominating committees, is often considered important by many regulatory bodies and investors (John and Senbet, 1998; Gillan and Starks, 2000; Deli and Gillan, 2000) . 8 So, while could expect that, in general, the monitoring capabilities of a board should be decreasing in its size and increasing in its independence, the respective benefits of these characteristics are likely to differ across firms. For example, for some industries, such as commercial banking, the benefits from a larger board for such aspects as political clout with a regulatory body (e.g., Agrawal and Knoeber, 2001) (Jensen, 1993; Goyal and Park, 2002), Brickley, Coles, and Jarrell (1997) provide contrasting evidence that the costs of separating the CEO and COB positions may exceed the benefits. An alternative structure to the separation of these positions is to designate a lead independent director. 10 The design of both structures is to increase the board's power in its relationship with management, suggesting that these are two additional factors beyond board size, independence, and committee structure that affect the board's monitoring capabilities. 
Charter provisions
The second major set of internal governance mechanisms derives from a firm's corporate charter and bylaws, the set of rules and procedures under which each firm operates.
The importance of the charter and bylaw provisions and their effects as governance mechanisms is evidenced by studies showing the inverse relation between firm performance and these provisions (e.g., Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2003) as well as by shareholder proposals seeking amendments to such measures (e.g., Gillan and Starks, 1998 , 2000 , 2007 .
Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) have developed an index of the charter provisions (and some aspects of state law), the G index, which varies from 0 to 24 depending on the number of provisions included in a firm's charter. In our analysis, we primarily use the 11 Many companies have combined nominating and governance committees. Consequently, we focus on the existence and independence of nominating committees, and simply track the existence of governance committees. 12 We define an independent director as one that is not affiliated with the firm as an executive or in any other capacity. The other two types of directors are insiders (those currently employed) or "grey" (those directors that are not currently employed by the firm, but either have a business relation with the firm or were previously employed by the firm).
Gompers, Ishii and Metrick G index, but for some parts we use a smaller set of nine of the more prevalent provisions for which we have data. 13 These are shown in Panel B of Table 1 . The most prevalent provision of this group is blank check preferred, which has been adopted by 89%
of the sample firms. The next two most prevalent provisions are classified board and poison pill, which have been adopted by 59% and 53% of the firms, respectively. The percentages for these are consistent with those found for 1998 in Table I of Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) .
14 (See Appendix A for a more detailed discussion of each of these provisions).
Announcements of the adoption of many of these amendments have been met with negative stock price responses, suggesting that shareholders perceive them as wealth-reducing (e.g., Jarrell and Poulsen, 1988a, 1988b; Malatesta and Walkling, 1988; Ryngaert, 1988 
State laws
The remaining major controllable factor in the firm's governance structure is the state of incorporation. Bebchuk and Cohen (2002) find that states offering stronger antitakeover protections are more successful in attracting out-of-state incorporations and more successful in 13 Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2004) provide evidence that six charter provisions are the most important, which they include in an entrenchment index that is a subset of the G index. Our set of nine provisions shown in Panel B includes five of the six Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell entrenchment index provisions.
(The provision omitted is a golden parachute provision). 14 The only large difference in presence of provisions between our sample and that of Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) is that they omit dual-class firms and we do not, which means we have a larger set of firms with unequal voting rights. 15 For example Bebchuk, Coates, and Subramanian (2002) Cohen (2002) and Gartman (2000) . 17 We also employ an alternative measure of state laws through an indicator variable for whether the firm is incorporated in Delaware. Delaware has extensive case law and is prominent as a corporate domicile.
Univariate evidence of interrelations between governance mechanisms
As the last section shows, with regard to internal governance mechanisms, directors and management have a number of choices in deciding upon mechanisms for their firms. Thus, examining the interrelations among these variables requires methodologies that can exploit or investigate the inherently multivariate nature of the data. To examine the relations among the numerous board structure variables, governance variables and state laws, we first calculate simple averages across the variables. We then adopt two multivariate approaches: first, we use cluster analysis to examine the coexistence of certain governance characteristics, and second,
we use principal components analysis to capture the commonalities in the diverse board characteristics and aggregate them into one representative variable. 16 It should be noted that the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) G index includes state laws that do not have analogs in the charter provisions. 17 Bebchuk and Cohen (2002) term the first five as standard antitakeover devices and the sixth as an extreme device (only Pennsylvania and Ohio have such a law).
Univariate analysis: Board and state law variables across G categories
As a first step in examining the interrelations among charter provisions, board structure characteristics, and state laws, we group the firms by their G index (while collapsing the extreme values of G into G≤5 and G≥14, respectively), and calculate the averages across the board characteristics and state law variables. The results of this analysis are provided in with the G score, and the last two columns provide statistical tests for differences across the G<9 versus G>10 subsets of the sample (we exclude the middle firms, where G equals 9 or 10 from those tests). The first section of the table provides summary measures for the existence of various board committees. As expected from the overall sample data in Table 1 , the first, the audit committee, is present among virtually all of the firms, implying a lack of discriminatory power across firms for the existence of an audit committees. Similarly, compensation committees are so prevalent that although we find a statistically significant difference across the G indexes, there is little economic significance to the differences. On the other hand, the existence of a corporate governance committee or a nominating committee varies both statistically and economically across the G scores. The existence of these committees suggests that the directors (and the shareholders on whose behalf they act) have more power in their relationships with management. Firms with high G indexes, indicative of management entrenchment and less ability for the market for corporate control to work, tend to have these two board committees much more often than firms with low G indexes, suggesting that boards in firms with high G indexes have power to contain management in other ways and that the presence of these committees and lack of charter provisions act as substitutes.
The next group of board variables focuses on the percentage independence of the board and its committees. In every case, the higher is the G index, the more independent are the compositions of the board and its committees. Furthermore, these differences are statistically significant between the high-and low-G groups. This suggests a trade-off between managerial entrenchment, as represented by the G index, and a powerful board, as suggested by the board structure variables.
The only coefficients that do not support this interpretation are those for board size and the separate chair indicator. As discussed earlier, Jensen (1993) and Yermack (1996) suggest that communication and coordination problems with larger boards imply that smaller boards are more efficient. Thus, given the results on board independence (another measure of board strength), one would expect a negative relation between board size and the G index, if the powerful, independent boards also tend to be smaller. But, as Table 2 shows, board size is positively correlated with the G index. The firms with the fewest number of charter provisions, G ≤ 5, have the smallest boards, at about 8.5 members, while the firms with the highest G index, G ≥ 14, have the largest boards, with an average of almost 11 board members. These differences are born out in the statistical tests of the high-and low-G groups, as well.
Similarly, as Table 2 shows, the likelihood of a separation between the chairman of the board and CEO positions generally decreases in the G index, which would seem to imply that as G decreases, the CEO has more power in dealing with the board. For example, 35% of the lowest G index firms have separation between the chairman of the board and the CEO, versus about 25% of the highest G index firms. Of note, however, is that these two variables on board size and separation of titles are arguably the most controversial in the literature. For example, as discussed earlier, there are reasons that a larger board would be beneficial for some firms.
Similarly, evidence exists that the costs of separating the CEO and Chairman positions exceed the benefits (Brickley, Coles, and Jarrell, 1997) . Alternatively, the fact that large boards and separate titles are associated with more independent boards is consistent with the idea that the costs of having larger boards or a more powerful CEO are decreasing in the independence of the board (overall and/or its committee structures). Put another way, perhaps the cost of concentrated CEO power or board coordination are the most severe for boards that are dominated by insiders.
The last section of the table shows the differences in state laws across the G categories.
Interestingly, the number of state provisions is significantly increasing in the G index, consistent with state antitakeover protections acting as complements for firm-level charter amendments, rather than as substitutes. However, incorporation in Delaware is negatively related to the G index; 69% of the firms in the lowest G index group are chartered in Delaware, compared to 53% of the firms in the highest G index group.
Cluster analysis
In the univariate analysis we are able to capture singular relations, but the different board characteristics and provisions suggest that a multivariate analysis would be more appropriate. Consequently, we employ cluster analysis to examine the interrelations among the variables. 18 The goal of cluster analysis is to find commonalities among the firms' governance characteristics by segregating the observations into clusters that minimize the distance within the clusters and maximize the distance across clusters. That is, we group the observations to maximize the homogeneity of governance mechanisms within a group, and maximize heterogeneity across groups. Due to the large number of observations in our sample, we employ the non-hierarchical k-means clustering methodology and pre-specify the number of groups (clusters) at four. 19 Rather than employing multiple yearly observations for each firm's governance variables, we develop a summary measure by taking firm-level averages of all variables and then running the analysis on the firm-level means. (That is, each firm has one observation.) Thus, we are capturing cross-sectional variation in our sample rather than time series variation, consistent with the fact that many governance provisions (especially charter provisions) do not change much over time. Table 3 provides the results of the cluster analysis and for each cluster presents the means of the governance variables that are used to sort the firms into clusters. As the table shows, there is a reasonably monotonic relation across the four groups. As one moves from Cluster 1 to Cluster 4, boards tend to get smaller and less independent, and firms have fewer charter provisions. Thus, more powerful board structures appear to be substitutes for monitoring by the market for corporate control.
Looking more closely at the individual provisions reveals relations that are generally consistent with this interpretation. For example, the likelihood of the board having a corporate governance committee decreases from Cluster 1 to Cluster 4. Similarly, both boards as a whole and the individual committees become less independent across the clusters. As in the previous univariate analysis, board size works in the opposite direction. The presence of charter provisions generally decreases monotonically across the clusters, with more firms having these amendments in Clusters 1 and 2 than in Clusters 3 and 4. The exception is for firms with unequal voting rights which show the opposite pattern, perhaps suggesting a substitution between this provision and the others. Examining the number of firms in each cluster also
indicates that large independent boards with many antitakeover measures are more common than are insider-dominated boards with fewer antitakeover measures.
Taken together, Tables 2 and 3 The extent to which institutions monitor the firm, through their trading activities (e.g., Parrino, Sias and Starks, 2003) or their direct monitoring activities (e.g., Hartzell and Starks, 2004) , may put pressure on the firm to adopt or refrain from adopting certain charter provisions.
Thus, we include proxies for both total institutional ownership as a fraction of shares outstanding (Total Inst'l Ownership) and a Herfindahl index of the concentration of institutional ownership, both derived from the 13-f filings (Inst'l Herfindahl). 20 One problem with using institutional ownership is that it can also be endogenous in that institutional investors may be attracted to certain firms and to their corporate governance. Research has found that institutions are attracted to certain firm characteristics (e.g., Del Guercio, 1996; Falkenstein, 1996; Gompers and Metrick, 2000; Bennett, Sias and Starks, 2003) .
Firm age should be important to the presence of certain charter provisions. Those firms that existed in the 1980's when many antitakeover amendments were adopted may have more amendments than younger firms. In general, older firms may have a higher probability of putting in place antitakeover amendments that are not subsequently removed. In support of this hypothesis, Berry, Fields, and Wilkins (2005) and Boone, Field, Karpoff, and Raheja (2005) find evidence that board structures evolve systematically over the 10 or 11 years after a firms' initial public offering, growing and becoming more independent as the firms age. 21 To capture the effects of firm age and size, we employ proxies for these characteristics: firm age (Ln(Firm Age), measured in years since incorporation and firm size (Ln(Total Assets),.
Similarly, the evidence of evolving corporate governance over the early years of the firm's life suggests that the stage of the firm's growth or life cycle would affect the choice of governance mechanisms. For example, monitoring by the board is likely to provide a greater benefit for growth firms, where management has more important choices to make and more of the value of the firm is intangible. As proxies for the growth stage of the firm, we calculate the 20 Due to some extreme outliers in the Herfindahl index, we winsorize this variable at the one-percent level.
21 Denis and Sarin (1999) examine the evolution of ownership and boards in established firms.
ratios of research and development expenditure to sales (R&D/Sales), capital expenditures to sales (Cap Ex/Sales), and property, plant and equipment to assets (PP&E/Assets).
Empirical evidence suggests other firm characteristics that would be important in governance choice. The recent performance of the firm's stock and its valuation by the market can create opportunities in the takeover market for others, creating an environment in which antitakeover amendments are adopted (e.g., Datta and Iskandar-Datta, 1996) . Firm performance can also affect board composition by causing such events as changes in the CEO's relative power or changes in the need for monitoring (e.g., Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988) . Thus, we calculate each firm's annual stock return (Annual Return), and Tobin's Q (which can also be viewed as a proxy for growth opportunities). 22 The monitoring role of leverage has long been recognized; for example, Jensen (1986) and Hart (1995) argue that debt provides a self-governance mechanism for managers. We calculate the ratio of long-term debt to total assets as a proxy for leverage (Book Leverage). Given our assumption regarding the costs of monitoring, the uncertainty about the firm may affect the choice of governance mechanisms, e.g., via an effect on the costs of monitoring management. To measure this, we calculate Firm Volatility as the standard deviation of the firm's monthly returns. Finally, given that previous research has found charter provisions and boards related to insiders' ownership (e.g., Danielson and Karpoff, 1998; Denis and Sarin, 1999) , we also calculate the fraction of the firm's stock owned by directors and officers (Dir./Off. Holding). The firms are large, with median assets of $1.3 billion, of which about 20% are financed by debt.
If heterogeneity exists across firms in the costs and benefits of governance mechanisms, we would expect to find differences in firm characteristics across the firms associated with their governance choices. To test this hypothesis, we calculate the averages of the firm characteristics in each cluster (using the clusters as defined in the analysis for Table 3 ) and test for differences across the four clusters through an ANOVA test. Table 5 provides the results.
The probability levels from the ANOVA F-tests show that for most variables there exists at least one significant difference across the groups. Further, we find monotonicity in the relation for almost all of the variables. As one moves from Cluster 1 (independent boards, many charter provisions) to Cluster 4 (insider boards, few charter provisions), the firms have lower institutional ownership and are younger, smaller, more levered, and exhibit more volatility. All of the clusters have firms with substantial institutional ownership (greater than 50%), but the firms in Cluster 1 have greater institutional ownership than those in Cluster 4. We do not find significant differences in institutional ownership concentration as measured by the Herfindahl index. As expected, older firms tend to have higher G indices (and more independent boards).
The same holds true for firm size (which is correlated with firm age). The results indicate that insider ownership increases across the clusters, consistent with the suggestion that such firms need fewer anti-takeover restrictions due to their insider-dominated governance structure, and with the notion that the incentive effects of insider ownership reduces the relative benefits of monitoring by the board of directors. The average percentage of directors and officers holdings is 25% for Cluster 4 as compared to 6% for Cluster 1. These results are generally consistent with those of Boone, Field, Karpoff, and Raheja (2005) , who find that boards tend to become larger and more independent as firms age, as well as a negative relation between managerial stock ownership and board independence. But, notably, they find no relation between board independence and the G index, perhaps due to the fact that their firms are much younger than ours (they use the first 10 years following the firm's IPO, while our median firm has been incorporated for 30 years), or the fact that their sample is about half as large.
In Panel B of Table 5 , we examine how the nine individual provisions and state law variables change across the four clusters. First, we verify that the relations across clusters formed from the nine charter provisions is similar when comparing the G index across clusters.
This is indeed the case, as the summary G index drops across clusters in the same way that the individual charter provisions also decline. The same holds true for the state laws. As one moves from Cluster 1 to Cluster 4, there are fewer state law antitakeover measures.
To further understand the differences in firms across our clusters, we determine the industries that are most overrepresented in each cluster and the industries that are most underrepresented (consistent with Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick's (2003) focus on over-and under-represented firms in the extreme G classifications). To do so, we categorize firms into industries according to Fama and French (1997) and calculate those that have the largest positive or negative deviations from the overall average frequency. The three most overrepresented and three most underrepresented industries are shown in Panel C of Table 5 .
In Cluster 1, which includes the firms with the largest boards, more independent boards and many antitakeover measures, the most overrepresented industries include utilities, chemicals and banking. It is important to note that these are three of the more highly regulated industries in the United States. For these types of industries, the benefits from a larger board (such as political clout with a regulatory body as in Agrawal and Knoeber (2001) or help with attracting more business) may outweigh the increased communication and coordination costs that Jensen (1993) and Yermack (1996) argue make for more effective boards. Perhaps not surprisingly, these same industries are the three most underrepresented in Cluster 4.
In summary, Tables 3 and 5 paint a consistent picture of a substitution between powerful (independent) boards and a shareholder-friendly set of charter provisions that leaves the firm exposed to the market for corporate control. Generally, as the independence of the board increases, firms have more antitakeover provisions. We also find striking patterns in firm characteristics across the various clusters. Specifically, we find that the powerful-board/more antitakeover provision firms tend to be older, larger, less levered, less volatile, with greater institutional ownership and less insider ownership than their weak-board/fewer antitakeover provision counterparts. This is consistent with the benefit-cost ratio of board monitoring relative to that of monitoring via the market for corporate control differing as a function of these firm characteristics.
Principal components analysis
In the previous section, we showed that there appear to be strong interrelations between board structure and charter provisions. Tables 4 and 5 show large similarity across clusters in the dispersion of the major board structure variables and the major charter provisions, which suggests that it would be helpful in this analysis to have summary measures for these variables.
Although we have the G index from Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) as a composite measure for the charter provisions, we lack a composite measure of board structure that allows us to collapse board characteristics into a single variable. The diversity in the board characteristics does not allow for a simple aggregation technique as works with the charter provisions. Further, as discussed earlier, disagreement exists regarding the direction of the effects of several of the board characteristics: board size, separation of CEO and Chairman of the Board, and presence of a lead director. Thus, we eliminate these three variables from the summary measure and seek to capture the commonalities across the remaining board characteristics by using a principal components analysis. 23 For the cases in which the audit, compensation, and nominating committees do not exist for a firm, we substitute the overall board's independence in place of the committee independence. This substitution makes the reasonable assumption that the board as a whole makes the same decisions in place of such a committee. Since corporate governance committees by their nature are independent, we include an indicator variable for the existence of a corporate governance committee rather than a measure of its independence.
The results of this analysis are presented in Table 6 . The first principal component explains 58% of the variation in the board structure for the measures included in the analysis.
All of the variables have a positive loading on the first principal component with the largest loadings being on the independence of the overall board and the nominating committee. We construct a summary board structure variable by multiplying each of the component measures' coefficients in column 1 by the standardized variable for that measure and summing across the products. The board structure variable, which we label Board Structure, can be considered generally as a measure of board power since it reflects the independence of the board and the board's major committees, plus whether a corporate governance committee exists.
With our summary measure of board structure, we can now examine the interrelation between it and the Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) G index. We first examine the interrelation in a univariate manner by grouping firms according to their G index and then focus on the average summary board structure measure within each G classification as we did in Table 2 for each of the individual board variables. Consistent with the earlier table, the results presented in Table 7 indicate a large degree of substitution between powerful boards and the strength of the market for corporate control as indicated by the G index. The board structure variable increases across the G groups, with firms with lower G indices having weaker boards and firms with higher G indices having more powerful boards. Tests of differences (both parametric t-tests and non-parametric Wilcoxon tests) between firms with different G indices, i.e., firms with G indices less than 9 versus firms with G indices greater than 9, show that the differences are highly significant.
Multivariate analysis of interrelations between governance mechanisms
We have argued that firms' internal governance mechanisms can serve as substitutes for each other and that the costs and benefits of these mechanisms vary across firms, leading to different governance structures. We have also presented evidence suggesting that the costs and benefits are associated with firm characteristics. Although our analyses thus far have consistently provided support for the hypothesis that the different governance mechanisms serve as substitutes, they have not controlled for other differences across firms, which could affect the use of particular governance mechanisms. In this section we examine whether board structure and the use of charter provisions are related, while also including the firm characteristics: institutional ownership, firm age, recent stock market performance, the firm's valuation in the marketplace, firm size, leverage and the amount of information uncertainty. The results of the relation between the G index and the board characteristics and state law provisions are consistent across all eight specifications. The first column shows that the G index is increasing in board size and board independence. These results are consistent with our previous univariate analysis, but we are now also controlling for industry and firm characteristics. Adding the Delaware indicator and the state provisions sum variables, we find that firms incorporated in Delaware have a greater number of antitakeover provisions, which is consistent with Delaware being a management-friendly state. This is in contrast to the univariate evidence on Delaware in Table 2 , which indicated that the G index is negatively correlated with the incidence of incorporation in Delaware on a stand-alone basis. Further, firms incorporated in states with more statutory provisions are more likely to have a higher G index.
Including additional board characteristic variables in column 3 does not change any of the qualitative conclusions from the first two models. Having the CEO separate from the Chairman of the Board is associated with fewer charter provisions, suggesting that this aspect of the board structure does not act as a substitute for the choice of charter provisions (i.e., that strong CEOs who also have the Chairman title are more likely to be at firms with more antitakeover devices).
The existence of a corporate governance or nominating committee is associated with more charter provisions. Alternative specifications using either an ordered probit model or the purely cross-sectional regression with one observation per firm do not change any of the conclusions regarding the relations between the G index and the board characteristics, or state provision variables. The results from models 6-8 show that the G index is increasing in the composite board structure variable, which is again consistent with the univariate results.
The firm characteristics included in the regressions show that the G index is increasing in institutional ownership and decreasing in institutional ownership concentration. The latter result is consistent with the argument that institutional investors provide a monitoring influence on firms (e.g., Hartzell and Starks, 2003; Almazan, Hartzell and Starks, 2005) . The other strong determinant of the G index is firm age; older firms have significantly more charter provisions in place.
The inherent endogeneity of governance choices is a potential problem with our examination of the relation between charter provisions, board structure and state law provisions.
We address this issue through a three-stage least squares regression. We first regress each endogenous variable (the G index and the composite board structure variable) on all of the exogenous variables. We then regress each endogenous variable on the fitted value of the other one from the first stage, plus the appropriate exogenous variables. Finally, we use the estimated standard errors from the second stage to calculate a variance-covariance matrix that allows for correlation across the two equations, and run GLS on the stage two regressions with this covariance matrix.
In order to estimate this model, we need instruments for each of the variables of interest.
First, we assume that the state of incorporation is exogenous and that it only influences the choice of charter provisions. We regard this assumption as reasonable because the level of antitakeover protection that a state has in place is likely to affect firms' choice of charter provisions, but the state of incorporation should not directly affect board structure, and firms rarely change their state of incorporation (thus, in a sense, it is chosen prior to the structure of the board that we later observe --in most cases, many years later). Moreover, Heron and Lewellen (1998) find that reincorporations are rare outside of the 1986-1988 time period. For the firms in our sample, we find that the reincorporations into another state in our database to have been less than 1.5% of the observations. Thus, we employ the sum of each state's antitakeover provisions as our instrument for the G index equation.
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We then need variables that we expect to influence board design (through costs and benefits of board monitoring), but not directly influence the choice of charter provisions. We employ our proxies for the growth cycle of the firm, i.e., R&D/Sales, Cap Ex/Sales, and PP&E/Assets. We argue that these variables are likely to affects the costs and benefits of board monitoring, but should have no direct impact on the firm in the market for corporate control (other than through the board structure channel). 25 Thus, the structure that we have in mind is that boards inherit (and are unlikely to change) their state of incorporation, but the design of charter provisions (and hence, the G index) is in response to applicable state laws.
And, where firms are in their growth cycle has an impact on the design of their board (due to variation in costs and benefits of having a more independent board), but does not directly impact the viability of the firm as a target in the market for corporate control (other than through the impact on the structure of the board).
The results of these estimates are provided in Table 9 . In terms of the choice of charter provisions, as in the Table 8 specifications, we find that the antitakeover statutes in the firm's state of incorporation, institutional ownership, institutional ownership concentration, and firm age are significant factors. Further, in the pooled regression of this specification, additional firm characteristics are important in that Tobin's Q and leverage are associated with the choice of charter provisions. With regard to the board structure, we find that high R&D firms have more powerful boards (consistent with the high benefits of monitoring by the board in these type firms). Firms with low capital expenditures have more powerful boards (consistent with the hypothesis that firms late in their investment cycle, e.g., with more free cash flow, benefit from more monitoring). We also find that firms with more tangible assets have more powerful boards (consistent with lower costs of monitoring for these firms).
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Most importantly, when using this approach, we find evidence consistent with our earlier findings under the other approaches, that powerful boards appear to serve as a substitute for the market for corporate control, and that the causality runs from the board to the choice of charter provisions. 27 (The coefficient on the composite board structure is significant in the G index equation, but the coefficient on the G index is not significant in the board structure equation.) This is consistent with the intuition that boards choose charter provisions, but is not immediately obvious given that charter provisions change much less frequently than board structures.
28 26 For more evidence on the evolution and determinants of board size and independence, see Boone, Field, Karpoff, and Raheja (2005) . As noted earlier, they find no relation for their sample of younger firms between board independence and the G index. They also find little evidence that proxies for the costs and benefits of monitoring (e.g., R&D expense) are related to board independence, in contrast to our results. But, these differences could be due to differences in sample size, or their focus on firms immediately following their IPOs. 27 We obtain similar results if we use board independence rather than the first principal component board structure variable. 28 We find almost 3,700 firm-years where there was at least some change in our board variables, compared to about 450 firm-years with changes in charter provisions.
Conclusions
We hypothesize that corporate governance structures differ systematically across industries and firms due to differences in the costs and benefits of the monitoring mechanisms.
That is, since agency problems between shareholders and managers vary across firms due to differences in the firms' environments, the costs and benefits of monitoring those problems would be expected to vary as well. Thus, we examine the systematic relations between firms' controllable governance structures and factors in the firms' environments by analyzing board structures and the use of corporate charter provisions in a sample of more than 2,300 firms over a four-year period.
We find that firms cluster together in their use of the controllable governance structures (including the board, and bylaw and charter provisions) and that the structures appear to serve as substitutes. That is, firms that have powerful boards (in terms of independence) also have the greatest number of charter provisions, suggesting that the market for corporate control is less effective for these firms. In contrast, firms with less powerful boards tend to have few charter provisions, allowing the market for corporate control to provide greater monitoring.
While the Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) G index provides an intuitive measure of the power of management, no such measure exists for board characteristics. Using principal components analysis, we construct a measure for aggregating the board characteristics into one board structure variable. Consistent with the univariate evidence, we find that this measure tends to vary monotonically across the G index, with increases in our component (implying greater independence) associated with increases in G (implying more management-friendly use of antitakeover devices). Our results on the substitution between these two governance mechanisms are consistent with prior research that has found substitution effects between incentives and compensation (e.g., Gibbons and Murphy, 1992; Hallman, Hartzell and Parsons, 2005) . In addition to finding that firms' charter provisions (as measured by the G index) and board structures (as measured by the principal components analysis) are systematically related to each other, we also find strong relations between their levels and characteristics of the firms' environment. These findings provide support for the suggestion that governance structures are related to the relative costs and benefits of different governance mechanisms.
The results show that the board's power is negatively related to the degree of shareholder orientation in the firm's charter provisions, consistent with these two sets of mechanisms acting as substitutes. One question is why a powerful board would allow a management friendly charter provisions. The answer may lie in the argument that such provisions can help prevent managerial myopia (e.g., Stein, 1988) .
Finally, our analysis suggests some avenues for future research. Our evidence is largely cross-sectional given the breadth of our panel versus the length of time it covers. This leaves many open questions on the time-series behavior of governance structures. Further, we hope our results on determinants of governance structures and correlations across different governance mechanisms will prove useful to theoretical work on corporate governance. This table provides (2003) Governance Index, a sum of the number of 24 possible provisions in the firm's charter. Panel A shows the existence of committee variables, which are indicator variables equal to one if the committee exists and zero otherwise. Panel B shows the percent of the board and its committees that consist of independent directors, i.e., directors that are not affiliated with the company. Panel C shows other components of the board. The board size variable is the number of directors on the board. The separate chair and lead director indicator variables are equal to one if the company has separated the CEO and Chairman positions and equal to one if there is a lead independent director, respectively. Panel D shows the state law characteristics. The state provisions variable is an index based on the summation of the six possible state law provisions for the state in which the company is incorporated. The Delaware variable is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm is incorporated in Delaware. The table also includes t-tests and the nonparametric Wilcoxon Z test of the hypothesis that the board structure variable is different for firms with a G index below 9 versus firms with a G index greater than 10.
Table 1 Governance Summary Statistics
Tests of difference for G G<9 minus G>10 <=5 6-8 9-10 11-13 >=14 t test Wilcoxon Z P a n e lA n e lB Table 3 Cluster Analysis This table shows the results of a k-means cluster analysis where k equals four, and the clusters are formed using within-firm averages of each variable. The table shows the averages of the different board characteristics, charter provisions and state law variables within each cluster. The existence of committee variables are indicator variables equal to one if the committee exists and zero otherwise. The second set of variables shows the percent of the board and its committees that consist of independent directors, i.e., directors that are not affiliated with the company. The board size variable equals the number of directors on the board. The separate chair and lead director indicator variables are equal to one if the company has separated the CEO and Chairman positions and equal to one if there is a lead independent director, respectively. The existence of charter provisions variables are a series of indicator variables on eight major charter provisions which equal one if the company has the provision in its charter and zero otherwise. The last row shows the number of firms in each cluster. Table 3 . The characteristics are obtained on an annual basis as of the end of the calendar year and are averaged for each firm across the 1997-2000 time period (except that the G index is obtained for the years, 1998 and 2000) . The final column shows the probability values from an F-test of an ANOVA analysis with the null hypothesis that the means of the characteristics across the four clusters are equal. Total Inst'l Ownership is the percentage of shares outstanding held by institutional investors, and Inst'l Ownership Herfindahl is the sum of the squared fractional ownership of institutions. Firm Age is the number of years since incorporation. Annual return is the return on the firm's common equity over the previous calendar year. Tobin's Q is calculated as the market capitalization of the firm plus total assets minus common equity, all divided by total assets. Book Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets. Firm Volatility is the standard deviation of monthly stock returns. Dir./Off. Holdings is the percentage of shares outstanding held by the firms' directors and officer. The G index is the Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) Governance Index, a sum of the number of 24 possible provisions in the firm's charter. The state provisions variable is an index based on the summation of the six possible state law provisions for the state in which the company is incorporated. The Delaware variable is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm is incorporated in Delaware. Panel A presents the means for firm characteristics, Panel B presents the means of the G index and state law provisions, while Panel C shows the most under-and over-represented industries, based on the classification of Fama and French (1997 (2003) Governance Index, a sum of the number of 24 possible provisions in the firm's charter. The board structure variable is derived from a principal components analysis of five board characteristics: the percent of the board and its audit, compensation and nominating committees that are independent directors, i.e., directors that are not affiliated with the company and an indicator variable for the existence of a governance committee. The number of observations is the number of firms within each G index category. The table also includes t-tests and the nonparametric Wilcoxon Z test of the hypothesis that the board structure variable is different for firms with a G index below 9 versus firms with a G index greater than 10.
Tests of difference for G G<9 minus G>10 <=5 6-8 (4) and (7) are ordered probit regressions with pooled observations and standard errors clustered by firm. Columns (5) and (8) are cross-sectional regressions in which we have regressed each variable on year dummies and then averaged the residuals by firm. The G index is the Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) Governance Index, a sum of the number of 24 possible provisions in the firm's charter. In all specifications, we have winsorized G at 5 and 14. The board size and board independence variables are the number and percentage of independent directors on the board. The separate chair and lead director indicator variables are equal to one if the company has separated the CEO and Chairman positions and equal to one if there is a lead independent director, respectively. The existence of the Governance and Nominating committee variables are indicator variables equal to one if the committee exists and zero otherwise. The board structure variable is derived from a principal components analysis of five board characteristics: the percent of the board and its audit, compensation and nominating committees that are independent directors, i.e., directors that are not affiliated with the company and an indicator variable for the existence of a governance committee. The Delaware variable is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm is incorporated in Delaware. The state provisions variable is an index based on the summation of the six possible state law provisions for the state of incorporation. Total Inst'l Ownership is the percentage of shares outstanding held by institutional investors, and Inst'l Ownership Herfindahl is the sum of the squared fractional ownership of institutions. Firm Age is the number of years since incorporation. Annual return is the return on the firm's common equity over the previous calendar year. Tobin's Q is calculated as the market capitalization of the firm plus total assets minus common equity, all divided by total assets. Book Leverage is the ratio of longterm debt to total assets. Firm Volatility is the standard deviation of monthly stock returns. The last two rows show the rsquareds and number of observations in each regression. The regressions also include industry dummies in all specifications, and year dummies in the pooled OLS and ordered probit models. (-6.67 ) (-5.93 ) (-3.86 ) (-6.10 ) (-7.11 ) (-4.47 ) (-7.38 *** significant at the 0.001 level, ** significant at the 0.05 level, *significant at the 0.10 level
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Table 9 Three-Stage Least Squares Estimation of G Index and Board Structures
This table provides the results of a three-stage least squares regression of the G index and the summary board structure variables. We first regress the G index and the composite board structure variable on the exogenous variables. We then regress the two endogenous variables on the fitted value of the other one from the first stage, plus the appropriate exogenous variables. Finally, we use the estimated standard errors from the second stage to calculate a variance-covariance matrix that allows for correlation across the two equations, and run GLS on the stage two regressions with this covariance matrix. The results of the final regressions are provided below. Columns (1) and (2) are pooled regressions. Columns (3) and (4) are cross-sectional regressions in which we have regressed each variable on year dummies and then averaged the residuals by firm. The G index is the Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) Governance Index, a sum of the number of 24 possible provisions in the firm's charter. In order to prevent extreme observations of the G index from affecting the regressions, we have winsorized G at 5 and 14. The board structure variable is derived from a principal components analysis of five board characteristics: the percent of the board and its audit, compensation and nominating committees that are independent directors, i.e., directors that are not affiliated with the company and an indicator variable for the existence of a governance committee. The state provisions variable is an index based on the summation of the six possible state law provisions for the state in which the company is incorporated. R&D / Sales, Cap Ex / Sales and PP&E/Sales are ratios of Research and Development Expenses, Capital Expenditures, and Property, Plant and Equipment to Sales, respectively. R&D missing is an indicator variable equal to one if there is no R&D expense listed in the firm's income statement from COMPUSTAT. The Delaware variable is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm is incorporated in Delaware. Total Inst'l Ownership is the percentage of shares outstanding held by institutional investors, and Inst'l Ownership Herfindahl is the sum of the squared fractional ownership of institutions. Firm Age is the number of years since incorporation. Annual return is the return on the firm's common equity over the previous calendar year. Tobin's Q is calculated as the market capitalization of the firm plus total assets minus common equity, all divided by total assets. Book Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets. Firm Volatility is the standard deviation of monthly stock returns. The last row shows the number of observations in each regression. The regressions also include industry dummies in all specifications, and year dummies in the pooled models.
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